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This paper proposes an assignment model where sorting occurs on at-
tributes including both skills (Sattinger (1979)) and preferences (Tinbergen
(1956)). The key feature of this model is that in equilibrium, the wage func-
tion admits both jobs￿and workers￿attributes as arguments. Even under
positive assortative matching, the correlation between the contribution of
workers￿attributes to wages and that of jobs￿attributes can vary from -1 to
1 depending on the parameters of the model, i.e. preference, technology and
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1the distribution of both sets of attributes. This paper also presents condi-
tions under which nonadditive marginal utility and production function are
nonparametrically identi￿ed using observations from a single hedonic mar-
ket and proposes a nonparametric estimator. Finally, possible extensions of
the model to include the output market are also proposed.
JEL Classi￿cation: D3, J21, J23 and J31.
Keywords: Hedonic models, Personality traits, Firms and workers ￿xed ef-
fects, Rosen￿ s two-step procedure.
21 Introduction
Recent emerging empirical literature (e.g. Borghans et al. (2008)) has shown
the importance of personality traits in economics and in particular for earnings
(Bowles et al. (2001) and Mueller and Plug (2006)). This literature shows that
earnings are related to personality traits like risk aversion or conscientiousness.
One possible explanation for these wage di⁄erentials would be that personality
traits are linked to preferences for certain jobs￿attributes so that the correlation
between personality and earnings re￿ ects compensating wage di⁄erentials for jobs
disamenities. Yet, another explanation would be that personality traits are linked
to skills that enhance productivity on the job and hence lead to higher wages. For
instance, the documented positive e⁄ect of conscientiousness on earnings could
come about because conscientiousness enhances workers￿productivity or because
in equilibrium, more conscientious workers are mapped onto jobs whose attributes
are associated with negative intrinsic utility (tax controller) and hence require a
wage compensation.
The model presented in this paper is the ￿rst treatment of personality traits in
assignment models. This assignment model is concerned with the process by which
heterogenous workers that are characterized by a vector of attributes t, including
both skills and preferences, are assigned to heterogenous jobs characterized by a
vector of attributes z , including both required skills and disamenities. This paper
3shows that this type of assignment models yields an equilibrium1 that is de￿ned
by a mapping of workers￿attributes t onto jobs￿attributes z, a function say t(z) or
z(t), together with a wage function w(z;t) that depends on both workers￿attributes
and jobs￿attributes. This wage function is shown to be additive separable in z
and t, w(z;t) = wz(z) + wt(t).
The fact that the equilibrium wage function admits both workers￿and jobs￿
attributes as arguments has important implications for empirical applications and
in particular for two noteworthy segments. First, the model o⁄ers a natural expla-
nation for the presence of ￿rms￿and workers￿￿xed-e⁄ects in earnings regressions
using matched-employer-employee data and their empirically observed low or even
negative correlation, see Abowd et al. (1999). Since sorting occurs on both skills
and preferences, equilibrium wages are function of both workers￿attributes and
jobs￿attributes. However, even when sorting exhibits positive assortative match-
ing, the model does not imply that wage di⁄erentials due to workers￿attributes
correlate positively with wage di⁄erentials associated to jobs￿attributes. Both the
sign and magnitude of the correlation between workers￿and jobs￿￿xed-e⁄ects will
1The existence, uniqueness, purity and e¢ ciency of this type of models have been treated
elsewhere, e.g. Gretsky et al. (1992; 1999) deal with the so call endowment economy where
z is endowed to the ￿rm and Ekeland (2005) and more recently Chiappori et al. (2007) deal
with the generalization to hedonic production economy where z is produced by ￿rms with en-
dowed attributes say y. Chiappori et al. (2007) have shown that hedonic models are equivalent
to matching models and both belong to the general class of optimal transportation problems
(Monge-Kantorovich). Under the assumptions made in this paper, in particular, about the shape
of the pro￿t and utility functions and given absolute continuous distribution of characteristics
on both sides, an equilibrium exists, is unique and pure, see for instance Theorem 1, p. 3 in
Ekeland (2005).
4depend on the preference parameters, the technology parameters and the distri-
bution of workers￿and jobs￿attributes. This result is illustrated numerically for
the quadratic-normal economy.
Second, the model has implications for the estimation of preference (technology
respectively) parameters in hedonic models. Recently, Ekeland et al. (2002 and
2004) and Heckman et al. (2005) have shown conditions under which nonpara-
metric identi￿cation of additive and nonadditive marginal utility models of the
Tinbergen class, where sorting occurs on preferences only, is possible in a single
hedonic market. These conditions build on results from Matzkin (2003) on non-
parametric estimation of nonadditive random functions and depend crucially on
the assumption that wz(z) is known (or estimated from data on wages and z).
In the Tinbergen class of models assumed in Ekeland et al. (2004) and Heckman
et al. (2005), wages depend only on z and identi￿cation of wz(z) follows natu-
rally. However, in the uni￿ed economy, where workers￿attributes include both
preferences and skills, wages are given by the function w(z;t) = wz(z) + wt(t)
where the functions wz(z) and wt(t) are unknown.2 Without further assumptions,
wz(z) is not identi￿ed nonparametrically since for any value of t, the value of
2If one is willing to guess some parametric shapes for wz and wt, however, parametric iden-
ti￿cation is possible since, as shown by Ekeland et al. (2004), a generic feature of the model is
that wz(z(t)) is not colinear to wt(t). Of course, one would want wz and wt to be as ￿ exible as
possible and these functions could be parameterized using Cubic B-splines with k knots of the
form ws(z) =
Pk
j=￿1 asjBj(s0bs) for s = z;t and where as and bs are vectors of parameters to
be estimated and Bj is the jth B-spline of degree 3.
5z is uniquely determined by the mapping function z = z(t). This paper shows
conditions under which wz(z) is identi￿ed nonparametrically and proposes a non-
parametric estimator. First, it is shown that the mapping function z(t) is identi￿ed
nonparametrically using results from Matzkin (2003). This is a generalization to
the uni￿ed economy of Heckman et al.￿ s (2005) result obtained for the Tinbergen
class of models. Following the identi￿cation of z(t), a method to identify wz(z)
nonparametrically is proposed. This method relies on imposing shape restrictions
on the utility and production functions. In general, the method assumes i) that
the production function is additive separable in (z;t￿i) and ti, with t =< t￿i;ti >,
where the contribution of ti is a known di⁄erentiable function and ii) ti is a scalar
attribute in￿ uencing marginal utility. Assumption ii) insures that, ￿xing t￿i, vari-
ations in ti generate variations in wz(:) through the mapping function while as-
sumption i) guarantees that, at ￿xed t￿i, variations in ti generate variations in
wt(t) of know magnitude. With these two assumptions, wz is identi￿ed from data
in a single hedonic market. A special case of this method is met when attribute ti
is a strict preference that in￿ uences marginal utility but not productivity, i.e. the
output contribution of ti is known to be constant. In this case, ti is an exclusion
restriction as variations in ti generate variations in z(t) and hence wz(z) holding
wt(t) constant.
The remaining structure of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews
6the related literature. Section 3 presents the uni￿ed model for the hedonic endow-
ment economy. Section 4 presents a closed form solution for the wage function in
the quadratic-normal setup. Section 5 discusses the implication of the model for
￿rms￿and workers￿￿xed-e⁄ects in earnings regressions using matched-employer-
employee data as well as for the identi￿cation of preference parameters in a single
hedonic market. Section 6 discusses ￿rst an extension of the model to the hedonic
production economy, and then a generalization of the model including the product
market. Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
2 Related literature
The model presented in this paper nests existing assignment models in the liter-
ature. This literature is divided into two distinct classes of models depending on
the nature of the process governing assignment. One class of models, led by Tin-
bergen (1956), focuses on the assignment of workers to jobs based on preferences.
Within this class of models, jobs￿attributes z are seen as disamenity and workers
derive intrinsic disutility from z. Although jobs with di⁄erent attributes are un-
equally productive, output at a job with attribute z does not depend on workers￿
attributes t. Hence productivity is merely determined by jobs￿attributes and all
workers are equally productive at all jobs. In this class of models, workers select
jobs￿attributes to maximize their utility. The pricing function w(z;t) does not
7depend on workers￿attributes but merely on jobs￿attributes, i.e. w(z;t) = wz(z),
and is therefore interpreted as a compensating wage di⁄erential. As an example,
the preference class of models indicates that risk loving workers will tend to be-
come ￿remen as they command lower compensations for the risks taken on the
job, but yet, assumes that risk loving workers would just make as good ￿remen as
any other (risk averse) worker. While this class of models explains wage forma-
tion due to risk compensation, the model fails to explain wage formation due to
productivity di⁄erentials across workers.
In contrast, the second class of models, led by Sattinger (1979), focuses on the
assignment of workers to jobs based on skills. jobs￿attributes are seen as produc-
tive capacities and workers derive no intrinsic (dis-)utility from z. Both workers￿
and jobs￿attributes matter for productivity. Workers with certain attributes are
more productive at certain jobs than others. In this class of models, workers select
jobs￿attributes to maximize their wage and the wage function w(z;t) does not
depend on jobs￿attributes but merely on workers￿attributes, i.e. w(z;t) = wt(t).
For instance, the skills class of models indicates that conscientious workers will
tend to become tax controllers as conscientiousness is an important factor of pro-
ductivity on the job, but yet, assumes that conscientious workers derive the same
disutility from being a tax controller as less conscientious workers. While this class
of models explains wage formation due to di⁄erential productivity across workers,
8these models fail to explain wage formation due to preference compensation.
The model presented in this paper nests both Tinbergen￿ s and Sattinger￿ s mod-
els.3 Under the assumption that all jobs￿attributes lead to intrinsic disutility and
workers￿attributes do not a⁄ect productivity the model collapses to Tinbergen￿ s
model. Under the assumption that all workers￿attributes contribute to produc-
tivity and no job attributes lead to intrinsic disutility the model collapses to Sat-
tinger￿ s di⁄erential rents model.
There exist only few examples of closed form solutions for the hedonic price as
a function of attributes, i.e. w(z;t). The ￿rst was proposed by Tinbergen (1956).
Assuming that i) workers derive intrinsic disutility from all their attributes, ii) price
enters log linearly in the utility function, iii) intrinsic (dis-)utility is quadratic in
jobs￿attributes z, iv) the supply of products is exogenous (the hedonic endowment
economy model) and v) both workers and jobs￿attributes are normally distributed,
Tinbergen showed that the log of the equilibrium price is a function quadratic in
attributes z.4 Assuming i), ii￿ ), iii) and v) and relaxing iv) by allowing ￿rms to
produce job attributes and introducing production costs (the hedonic production
economy model), Epple (1984) provided a closed form solution for the hedonic
3Sattinger (1977) developed a compensating wage di⁄erential model where workers di⁄er in
terms of productivity and jobs in terms of the satisfaction workers receive from working at it, both
unidimensional. Workers and jobs attributes are encompassed in the de￿nition of job satisfaction
and cannot be distinguished from each other. Moreover, all jobs have similar productivity. There
is no complementarity between workers skills and jobs requirements.
4In fact, replacing ii) by ii￿ ) price enters linearly in the utility function, the level of the
equilibrium price would be quadratic in z.
9price function that is quadratic in z when production costs are also quadratic in
z. Sattinger (1979 and 1980) provided closed for solutions when jobs and workers
are di⁄erentiated along a single attribute (skills demanded and supplied) assuming
that workers derive no intrinsic disutility from the level of skills demanded by their
job, i.e. maximize their wage. This skills attribute a⁄ects productivity but does
not provide intrinsic utility. The pricing function of interest in this model is the
wage as a function of workers￿skills. Since skills provide no intrinsic disutility and
merely a⁄ect production, sorting in this model occurs on productive attributes
rather than preference attributes as in Tinbergen and Epple. Sattinger￿ s (1980)
closed form solutions for the wage function are obtained when the distribution of
jobs and workers are Pareto, production is multiplicative in attributes (i.e. Cobb-
Douglas) and utility depends on wages only. This last assumption is characteristic
of the di⁄erential rents model that precludes compensating wage di⁄erential for
intrinsic disutility derived from the type of jobs.
A closed form solution for the uni￿ed model is proposed in section 4 of this
paper. This solution is derived when workers￿and jobs￿attributes are normally
distributed and intrinsic disutility is quadratic in jobs￿attributes and productivity
is quadratic in workers￿attributes.
Finally, this paper relates to the general literature on hedonic models and not
only on that segment focussing on the labor market. For instance, Epple￿ s exten-
10sion of Tinbergen￿ s endowment economy to a production economy was originally
written in a consumer/producer context, not a worker/￿rm context. In the con-
sumer/producer model, the restriction that consumers￿attributes do not a⁄ect
the production of goods does not at ￿rst sight seem to be too strong. However,
the generalization proposed in section 6 of this paper is also relevant in that case.
Think for instance of an economy where ￿rms are endowed with a vector of at-
tributes y. In this economy, to produce good z, ￿rms need to hire a ￿xed number
of workers, one and only one worker for simplicity. Suppose further that the at-
tributes of that worker, say t0, matter in the production process so that the costs
(pro￿ts) of producing good z depend on t0. Firms need now to optimize not only
on z but also on t0.
3 The uni￿ed hedonic endowment economy model
3.1 Setup
Consider a static labor market where workers match one-to-one with ￿rms. Let
each ￿rm be endowed with a single machine. The supply of machines is therefore
assumed exogenous to the model,5 and the assumption that workers and ￿rms
5The assumption that ￿rms are endowed with a machine z can be released by supposing
that ￿rms are endowed with a vector of attributes y (investments capacity, managers￿attributes
etc.) and ￿produce￿their machine z. The distribution of machines is then endogenous to the
model. This case corresponds to the hedonic production economy and is dealt with section 6
of this paper. The main results of the paper remain unchanged but the mechanic of the model
11match one-to-one therefore means that to produce output each machine must be
operated by one and only one worker. Let a machine be characterized by a vector of
attributes denoted by z 2 Rnz. To ￿x ideas, machines attributes could be the level
of physical strength involved in operating the machine, the level of intellectual
complexity involved, the level of noise generated by the machine, the degree of
risks taken while operating the machine, etc. Let fz(z) and Fz(z) be the PDF
and CDF of z respectively and let Fz be absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure.
Similarly, suppose that workers are endowed with a vector of attributes t 2 Rnt.
These attributes could refer to cognitive ability such as physical strength, intel-
lectual ability but also personality traits such as conscientiousness, risk aversion
etc.. Let the distribution of t be exogenous and let ft(t) and Ft(t) be its PDF and
CDF respectively and let Ft be absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
measure.6
In contrast to Tinbergen (1956), Epple (1984), Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004)
and Heckman et al. (2005), the model does not require workers￿attributes to be
non productive. Let the output of each machine depend on its own attributes
simpli￿es signi￿cantly by assuming machines are endowed.
6It should be noted here that the mass of workers is assumed to be equal to the mass of
￿rms. The model could be accommodated to allow for di⁄erent masses and would inevitably
lead to unemployed workers or vacancies in equilibrium depending on whether the mass of workers
exceeds that of ￿rms. Although assignment models o⁄er an interesting structure to analyze which
agents are kept out of the market by the equilibrium pricing, the primary aim of this paper is
to analyze wage formation when workers￿attributes are both skills and personality traits. The
assumption of equal mass does not seem to be restrictive with respect to this aim.
12but also on the attributes of the worker operating this machine. Let p(z;t;E)
be a continuous function indicating the units of output produced by the pair
(z;t) where E are technology parameters common to all ￿rms. An attribute i
is not a productive attribute if and only if
@p(z;t;E)
@ti = 0 for all z and t. Note
that some attributes may be productive at some jobs but not at others. While
skills of di⁄erent types will clearly a⁄ect productivity, some preferences may also
a⁄ect productivity, for instance, a risk averse person might also tend to operate a
machine slower, conscientious workers may take better care of their machine, etc...
Let w(z;t) be the wage of a worker with attributes t when assigned to a ma-
chine with attributes z and let r(z;t) be the rents of a ￿rm owning machine with
attributes z when employing a worker with attributes t. Note that, by de￿nition,
product is exhausted so that p(z;t;E) ￿ w(z;t) = r(z;t).
In contrast to Sattinger (1979), the model does not require that jobs￿attributes
do not a⁄ect intrinsic disutility. Assume that utility u ￿ u(c;t;z;A) is a continuous
function where A are preference parameters common to all workers. Utility u
depends on consumption c, equal to w(z;t) by assuming no unearned income,
and the job satisfaction derived from the attributes of the machine workers￿are
assigned to. More speci￿cally, let j(z;t;A) be a continuous function capturing job
dissatisfaction. The function j could take the speci￿c form proposed by Tinbergen
(1956), j(z;t;A) = 1
2 (z ￿ t)
0 A(z ￿ t) where A is a positive de￿nite matrix of
13parameters. We therefore have u(c;t;z;A) = w(z;t)￿j(z;t;A). A job attribute i
does not provide intrinsic utility if and only if
@j(z;t;A)
@zi = 0 for all z and t.
3.2 Equilibrium
De￿nition 1 An equilibrium is a wage function w(z;t) and a mapping function
t(z;A;E;wz;wt) so that i) ￿rms￿supply of machines with attributes z equals work-
ers￿demand for machines with attributes z everywhere on the support of z, ii)
workers maximize utility and iii) ￿rms maximize rents.7

















Let z(t;A;wz) denote the implicit function that solves Equation 1 for z given
parameters A and a function wz where wz ￿ @w
@z . This function indicates the
7Existence, uniqueness, purity and e¢ ciency of hedonic models have been studied elsewhere:
Gretsky et al. (1992;1999), Ekeland (2005), and Chiappori et al. (2007). Under the standing
assumptions formulated in the setup above, an equilibrium allocation exists, is unique, and e¢ -
cient. It will also be pure if the generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition is satis￿ed. An equilibrium
wage function exists, and is unique if every workers and every ￿rms participate (full employment
and no vacancies).
14optimal machine a worker with attributes t chooses given preference parameters
A and the shape of the wage function and in particular the wage di⁄erential at z.






























15Let t(z;E;wt) denote the implicit function that solves Equation 2 for t given
parameters E and a function wt where wt ￿ @w
@t . This function indicates the
optimal choice of worker for a ￿rm with machine z given productivity parameters
E and the shape of the wage function and in particular the di⁄erential at t.
If the equilibrium is pure, the two mapping functions z(t;A;wz) and t(z;E;wt)
are invertible. We therefore have the restriction t￿1(t;E;wt) = z(t;A;wz) and, for
notational clarity, re-write the implicit function as t(z;A;E;wz;wt) without loss of
generality. Note that for the equilibriummapping to be pure, i.e. t(za;A;E;wz;wt) =
t(zb;A;E;wz;wt) =) za = zb, the generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition must be
satis￿ed, see Ekeland (2005). Write the total surplus of a pair (z;t) as s(z;t;E;A) ￿
p(z;t;E) ￿ w(z;t) + u(t;z;A) = p(z;t;E) ￿ j(z;t;A), the generalized Spence-

















For an equilibrium allocation to be reached, the supply of machines with at-
tributes z should be equal to workers￿demand for machines with attributes z for
all z. This means that:
16fz(z)dz = ft(t(z;A;E;wz;wt))





Equilibrium will be reached by choosing the right shape for the function w and
in particular the right di⁄erentials at t and z. Workers and ￿rms will participate
if their wage and rents are larger than their reservation levels. To close the model,
the usual assumption (see Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004) and Sattinger (1979)
among others) is to ￿x a reservation value for the utility, say u and rent r so
that u and r must be larger than their respective thresholds. Ekeland (2005) has
shown that the wage function has a unique solution on the support of z. The
equilibrium in this economy is therefore characterized by a wage function w(z;t)
and a mapping of workers￿attributes onto jobs￿attributes t(z;A;E;wz;wt) so that
i) supply equals demand everywhere on the support of z , ii) workers maximize
utility and iii) ￿rms maximize rents.
3.3 Proposition
Proposition 2 In the uni￿ed model spelled out above, the equilibrium wage func-
tion w(z;t) is additive separable in z and t.
Proof. To see this, ￿rst note that even though the ￿rst order conditions tie the
17partial derivatives of w to the slopes of production p(:;:) and job dissatisfaction
j(:;:), there are no restrictions on the second order cross-partial derivative
@2w(z;t)
@z@t .









would do, including the additive separable function
@2w(z;t)
@z@t = 0. However, the
￿rst order conditions need only be satis￿ed on the allocation path t(z) or z(t).









dz + ct + c
where ct + c is a constant of integration. The use of splitting the constant into ct
and c will become clear below.










dt + cz + c
where cz + c is a constant of integration.

















Proposition 1 plays a central role in the nonparametric identi￿cation of the
model, presented in section 5 of this paper, and in particular for the identi￿cation
of the mapping function z(t).
3.4 Special cases
The following special cases are noteworthy for their importance in the nonpara-
metric identi￿cation of the model. Suppose that not all jobs￿attributes provide









where zp is a vector of those jobs￿attributes that derive intrinsic disutility, i.e.
@j(z;t;A)
@zp > 0, and zs its complement containing attributes that derive no intrinsic
disutility,
@j(z;t;A)












This has two important implications. First, the implicit function z(t;A;wz)
will only have solutions for jobs￿attributes zp, not for zs. In other words, the ￿rst
order condition to utility maximization only solves the assignment problem for zp
as a function of all t. All mappings of zs on t would lead to the same pricing
equilibrium. However, if all workers￿attributes t are productive, the ￿rst order
condition to pro￿ts maximization in equation 2, yields a mapping of all t on all z.
Its inverse will provide a unique solution for zs as a function of t.
Second, the wage di⁄erential for jobs￿attributes zs, corresponding to attributes










Hence, holding zp ￿xed, variations in zs provide variations in all t = t(z)
and hence in wages through wt while wz remains constant. Attributes zs provide
exclusion restrictions that enable nonparametric identi￿cation of wt and wz in a
20single hedonic market.
Similarly, suppose now that workers￿ attributes tp are not productive, i.e.
@p(z;t;E)
@tp = 0 for all t and z, whereas attributes ts are,
@p(z;t;E)
@ts > 0. From the












Again, the implicit function t(z;E;wt) will only have solutions for workers￿
attributes ts, not for tp. In other words, the ￿rst order condition to pro￿ts maxi-
mization only solves the assignment problem for ts as a function of all z. If all jobs￿
attributes z are disamenities, however, the ￿rst order condition to utility maxi-
mization in equation 1, yields a mapping of all z on all t. The wage di⁄erential









Hence, holding ts ￿xed, variations in tp provide variations in all z = z(t)
and hence in wages through wz while wt remains constant. Attributes tp provide




Let nz = nt = n. Suppose that, as in Tinbergen (1956) job dissatisfaction is
de￿ned as j(z;t;A) = 1
2 (z ￿ t)
0 A(z ￿ t), where A is a positive de￿nite matrix of
preference parameters. Suppose further that productivity is given by p(z;t;E) =
b0 + b0z + c0t + 1
2z0Bz + 1
2t0Ct + t0Dz with E = fb0;b;c;B;C;Dg and where b0
is a positive constant, b and c are vectors ￿lled with positive constants or zeros
and B, C and D are matrices of parameters. The parameters contained in b
and B indicate how productive a machine with attributes z is, independently of
the attributes of the worker operating this machine, i.e.
@p(z;t;E)
@z = b + Bz The
parameters contained in c and C indicate the extent to which workers￿attributes
a⁄ect productivity, independently of the attributes of the machine, i.e.
@p(z;t;E)
@t =
c+Ct. The parameters contained in D indicate the extent to which the attributes
of machines complement or substitute workers￿attributes, i.e.
@p(z;t;E)
@z@t = D.
Note that since t and z take on negative values with positive probability, i)
the productivity of machines decreases with workers￿attributes for some machines
with negative attributes,
@p
@t = c + Ct + Dz < 0 for some z, and ii) the productiv-
22ity of workers decreases with machines attributes for some workers with negative
attributes,
@p
@z = b + Bz + Dt < 0 for some t. However, the share of machines and
the share of workers for which i) and ii) hold can be made arbitrarily small by
varying the parameters of the distribution of z and t.
The generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition will be satis￿ed as long as jD + Aj 6=
0. As long as jD + Aj 6= 0, equilibrium is pure for any distributions Ft and Fz
so that the mapping function t(z) is invertible with inverse z(t) ￿ t￿1(t). The
mapping function t(z) is linear when the distributions of t and z are normal.
The ￿rst order conditions read now as:8
@w(z;t)
@z
= A(z ￿ t)
@w(z;t)
@t
= c + Ct + Dz
Note that the wage di⁄erential for jobs￿attributes is (positively) related to
workers preference parameters A while the wage di⁄erential for workers￿attributes
8The second order conditions are trivial and given by:
@2w(z;t)




23is related to (a subset of) E.
It is now easy to see that the ￿rst order conditions yield linear mapping of jobs￿
attributes on workers￿attributes if and only if
@w(z;t)
@t is linear in t and
@w(z;t)
@z is
linear in z. This, in turns, implies that the equilibrium wage function is quadratic
and reads as:











where wz(z) = ￿
0z + 1
2z0￿z and wt(t) = ￿
0t + 1
2t0￿t.
Using equation 3 in equations 1 and 2 respectively and rearranging yields:
￿ + (￿ ￿ A)z = ￿At (4)
￿ ￿ c + (￿ ￿ C)t = Dz (5)
These are linear functions and the reduced form solution will be of the form
t = ￿0 + ￿1z or z = ￿￿
￿1
1 ￿0 + ￿
￿1
1 t. Plugging t = ￿0 + ￿1z into 4 yields
￿ = ￿A￿0 and ￿ = A(I ￿ ￿1). Plugging z = ￿￿
￿1
1 ￿0 + ￿
￿1
1 t into Equation 5
yields ￿ = c ￿ D￿
￿1
1 ￿0 and ￿ = C + D￿
￿1
1 .
24As noted earlier by Tinbergen (1956) and Epple (1984), when attributes on both
sides of the labor market are normally distributed, i.e. z￿ > N(￿z;￿z) and t￿ >
N(￿t;￿t), linear mapping functions of the form t = ￿0+￿1z equilibrate supply and
demand. Indeed, the equilibrium condition ft(t)dt1dt2:::dtN = fz(z)dz1dz2:::dzN
given normally distributed attributes, is equivalent to equating the means, i.e.
￿t = ￿0 + ￿1￿z and equating the variances, i.e. ￿t = ￿0
1￿z￿1.
To ￿nd the solution for ￿0 and ￿1, ￿rst note that ￿t = ￿0
1￿z￿1 = (￿￿1)
0 ￿z (￿￿1).
There are therefore two solutions to this equilibrium condition, one with positive
assortative matching ￿1 > 0 and one with negative assortative matching ￿1 < 0.
These two solutions however will give rise to di⁄erent total surplus. The one that
maximizes total surplus will prevail. If workers￿and jobs￿attributes are globally
complements (substitutes) in surplus, i.e. D + A > 0, then total surplus will be
maximized by mapping higher t with higher (lower) z, i.e. ￿1 > 0 (< 0). The
solution for ￿0 and ￿1 is:9
9Note that the power p, p 2 R, p 6= 0, of a square matrix A of size n ￿ n is obtained as
ApX = Xdiag(￿) where X is matrix of size n ￿ n formed of the n eigenvectors of A and ￿ is
the vector containing the corresponding eigenvalues. If in addition A is symmetric, then X is
orthogonal so that X0X = XX0 = I and, post-multiplying both sides by X0, the result simpli￿es
to Ap = Xdiag (￿)
p X0. The matrix Ap will be real if and only if all eigenvalues ￿ are real and
strictly positive that is if and only if A is positive de￿nite. Since ￿t and ￿z are symmetric,








z will be real if and only if all
eigenvalues of ￿t and ￿z respectively are real and positive. (See Bosch (1987))
















￿￿1 if D + A > 0
















￿￿1 if D + A < 0








1 = I where I is the identity
















1￿z. Pre-multiply both sides of this
equation by ￿
￿1



















































































































The constant ￿0 is not identi￿ed. To close the model, the usual assumption
(see Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004), Heckman et al. (2005) and Sattinger (1979)
among others) is to ￿x a reservation value for the utility, say u and rent r so that
u and r must be larger than their respective thresholds.
To summarize, we have shown that the equilibrium parameters of the wage
function ￿, ￿, ￿ and ￿ are retrieved from the distribution parameters of workers￿
and jobs￿attributes using the mapping function t(z) = ￿0 + ￿1z where ￿1 is
identi￿ed by the variances and covariances of workers￿and jobs￿attributes only
and ￿0 is identi￿ed from the means of workers and jobs￿attributes and from ￿1.
The second order coe¢ cients of the wage function ￿ and ￿ depend only on the
matrix of variances and covariances of workers￿and jobs￿attributes. The ￿rst
order coe¢ cients ￿ and ￿ depend on the matrix variances and covariances and the
means of workers￿and jobs￿attributes.
274.2 Relations to Tinbergen (1956) and Sattinger (1979)
Tinbergen (1956), Epple (1984) and Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004) consider the
case where workers￿attributes do not contribute to production, i.e.
@p(z;t;E)
@t = 0
for all t and z, so that the ￿rst order condition to rents maximization in equation 2
indicate no wage di⁄erentials across workers￿attributes. In the quadratic-normal
example, this condition is met when D = C = 0 where 0 is a matrix ￿lled with
zeros, c0 = 0, so that equation 5 yields ￿ = C = 0 and ￿ = c = 0. Since D = 0 ,
the generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition for pure equilibrium is now satis￿ed for
jD + Aj 6= 0, the equilibrium will be pure in Tinbergen￿ s model only if jAj 6= 0.
The model proposed above admits Sattinger￿ s di⁄erential rents model as a
special case. This is the case when t and z are unidimensional and z carries no
intrinsic disutility so that
@j(z;t;A)
@z = 0 for all z and t or A = 0 in the quadratic-
normal example. From equation 2 (equation 4 respectively in the quadratic-normal
example) we then have ￿ = (A =) 0 and ￿ = 0 so that the wage function depends
merely on t. As soon as t is loaded with intrinsic disutility, A 6= 0 , the slope of the
rents function increases and the increase is more pronounced for higher z. Again,
since A = 0 , the generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition is satis￿ed if jD + Aj 6= 0.
285 Implications for empirical applications
5.1 Literature on matched employer-employee data
The model naturally generates equilibrium wage functions with both workers￿and
jobs￿(￿rms￿ ) attributes as arguments. Moreover, the model presented above does
not restrict the correlation between both contributions to wages. The correlation
could be anything between -1 and 1 depending on the production parameters E,
the preference parameters A and the distribution of attributes Ft and Fz.
This links the model to the empirical literature estimating wage functions us-
ing matched employer-employee data, e.g. Abowd et al. (1999). This literature
typically ￿nds that both workers￿and ￿rms￿￿xed-e⁄ects contribute signi￿cantly
to wage formation and the correlation between workers￿and ￿rms￿￿xed-e⁄ects
is low or even negative. While Shimer￿ s (2005) unidimensional assignment model
with coordinative frictions could generate low or even negative correlation if fric-
tions are large enough, the uni￿ed model presented above shows that a frictionless
economy could also be characterized by a low or negative correlation between the
contribution of workers￿attributes to wages and that of their job/￿rm even when
sorting exhibits positive assortative matching. This is possible as long as sorting
occurs on both skills and preferences.
To illustrate this result, consider the unidimensional quadratic-normal model,
i.e. nz = nt = 1. For the sake of the argument, think of persons with high t as risk
29loving persons and jobs with high z as risky jobs. Let A = D = 3, c = C = 0 and
let t￿ > N(￿t = 4;￿t = 3) and z￿ > N(￿z;￿z) where ￿z 2 [1;7] and ￿z 2 [1;5].
In the simulations presented below, each economy will be associated with di⁄erent




￿z > 0 so that in all economies simulated, assignment satis￿es
positive assortative matching so that larger values of t are assigned to larger values
of z in equilibrium.
For a given economy, i.e. for given values of ￿z and ￿z, I simulate a matched
employer-employee data set. In this data set, there are 400 ￿rms of identity j =<
1;:::;400 > and 400 workers of identity i =< 1;:::400 > observed in ￿ve successive
years. It is assumed that in each period a ￿rm employs one and only one worker
and a worker works in one and only one ￿rm. Each ￿rm j draws an attribute zj
from the distribution Fz and each worker i draws an attribute ti from Ft. In each
year of the panel, assignment of workers to ￿rms occurs according to the uni￿ed
model and the equilibrium wage is the solution provided above in the quadratic-
normal example. The worker with the highest t gets assigned to the ￿rm with the
highest z and etc. since ￿1 =
p
3 p
￿z > 0. To identify a ￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ect, we must
observe at least two di⁄erent workers working at that ￿rm over the time span.
Similarly, to identify a worker ￿xed-e⁄ect we must observe that worker at least in
two di⁄erent ￿rms over the time span. To create this type of mobility in the data
30while preserving the underlying equilibrium mapping t(z) = ￿0 + ￿1z and wage
function w(z;t) = ￿0+￿t+￿z+ 1
2￿t2+ 1
2￿z2 in each time period, that is holding A,
D, c, C, ￿z, ￿t, ￿z and ￿t constant over time, assume that each period, 5% of the
workers, randomly chosen, observe an increase in their attribute of 0:1 standard
deviation, i.e. from t to t+ 0:1 ￿
p
￿t = t + 0:1 ￿
p
3, and 5% of the workers,
randomly chosen, observe a decrease in their attribute of 0:1 standard deviation,
i.e. from t to t￿0:1￿
p
3. This has the e⁄ect of shu› ing the rank of workers and
hence the identity of the workers working in the various ￿rms while keeping the
distribution of t constant over time and therefore the hedonic assignment occurring
in each year. The correlation between ￿rms￿and workers￿￿xed-e⁄ects is therefore
only determined by the correlation between ￿ti+ 1
2￿t2
i and ￿zj+ 1
2￿z2
j for each pair
< i;j > along the equilibrium mapping t(z) = ￿0 + ￿1z and not due to changes
in the equilibrium wage function.
The econometrician only observes pairs < i;j > and the associated wage wij in
each period. The econometrician cannot estimate the function w(:;:).10 However,
since there is mobility of workers across ￿rms, the econometrician can estimate
￿xed-e⁄ects for workers and ￿rms by running a linear regression of the form w =
Pa+Fb+e where P is a matrix of dummy variables capturing the person e⁄ects and
F is a matrix of dummy variables capturing the ￿rm e⁄ects. The estimate a is an
10Note that, as a well-known general comment on the quadratic-normal economy, since the
mapping is linear, even if we would observe t and z, we would not be able to estimate the wage
function due to multicolinearity.
31estimate of a worker￿ s ￿xed-e⁄ect given by ￿ti + 1
2￿t2
i, equal to ￿ti+ 1
2￿t2
i for those
workers with ￿xed t over the 5-year window or to the mean of ￿ti + 1
2￿t2
i for those
with varying attributes, and the estimate of b is an estimate of ￿zj + 1
2￿z2
j. For
each ￿rm we can calculate the mean of workers￿￿xed-e⁄ects and then calculate the
correlation between ￿rms￿￿xed-e⁄ects and ￿rms￿mean of workers￿￿xed-e⁄ects.
Figure 1 plots the correlation between ￿rms￿￿xed-e⁄ects and (mean at the
￿rm of) workers￿￿xed-e⁄ects as ￿z increases from 1 to 8. Each curve on this
￿gure represents a di⁄erent value of the variance of job attributes ￿z =< 1;3;5 >.
The ￿gure indicates that the correlation varies between ￿0:6 and 0:4 in these
examples. Even though the true underlying model generating the panel data sets
is a frictionless assignment model with positive assortative matching, i.e. ￿1 =
p
3 p
￿z > 0, the correlation between ￿rms￿and workers￿￿xed-e⁄ects is not close to 1
and even is negative for a fairly large range of the parameter set.
5.2 Identi￿cation and estimation in a single hedonic mar-
ket
5.2.1 Identi￿cation
Since the seminal work by Rosen (1974), the traditional approach to estimate
preference parameters, i.e. parameters A of the function j(z;t;A),11 has consisted
11All techniques below apply also to the estimation of productivity parameters by symmetry.
32of two steps. In the ￿rst step, using market data on wages and jobs￿attributes,
one estimates the wage function to get b w(z) applying the functional form that ￿ts
best the data. In the second step, one uses the ￿rst order condition in Equation 1
together with the marginal wage derived from the ￿rst step, i.e.
@ b w(z)
@z , to recover
preference estimates j(z;t;A). Early literature by Brown and Rosen (1982), Epple
(1987), Bartik (1987) and Kahn and Lang (1988) has argued that j(z;t;A) cannot
be identi￿ed in a single hedonic market unless an arbitrary nonlinear marginal
utility is assumed. Recently, Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004) have shown that
nonlinearity is a generic feature of the hedonic model not an arbitrary choice
and Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004) and Heckman et al. (2005) have provided
conditions under which nonparametric identi￿cation of additive and nonadditive
hedonic models of the Tinbergen class is possible in a single hedonic market.
These conditions build on results from Matzkin (2003) on nonparametric esti-
mation of additive and nonadditive random functions. All the results from Eke-
land et al. and Heckman et al. crucially depend on the assumption that wz
z(z)
is known (or estimated from data on wages and z). In the Tinbergen class of
models, where wages depend only on z, identi￿cation of wz
z(z) follows by assump-
tion. However, in the uni￿ed economy, wages are given by the unknown function
w(z;t) = wz(z) + wt(t). The function wz(z) is not known in general.12 Moreover,
without further assumption, wz(z) is not identi￿ed non parametrically since for
12See footnote 2.
33any value of t, the value of z is uniquely determined by the mapping function
z = z(t).
Since all the identi￿cation results presented in Heckman et al. follow once wz(z)
is known, I focus in this paper on the identi￿cation of wz(z) and refer the reader
to Heckman et al. for identi￿cation results of j(z;t;A). The method proposed to
identify wz(z) relies on shape restrictions on the production function p(z;t;E).
Following Ekeland et al. and Heckman at al., assume that z is a scalar and t =<
to;tu > where to is a vector of observed attributes and tu is a scalar unobserved
(to the econometrician) attribute. Assume further that tu is independent of to.
The identi￿cation method requires ￿rst an identi￿cation of the mapping function
z = z(to;tu). Lemma 1 is a generalization of the identi￿cation proof provided
in Heckman et al. (2005) to the uni￿ed model. The additive separability of the
wage function guarantees that we end up with the same expression of the mapping
function as in Heckman et al. (2005), page 6.
Lemma 3 The mapping function z = z(to;tu) is identi￿ed in the uni￿ed hedonic
model.
Proof. See the Appendix:
Once the mapping function z(to;tu) is known, we can proceed to the identi￿-
cation of wz(z). The next theorem shows that imposing some shape restrictions
on the production function p(z;t;E) allows us to identify wz(z).




i 6= 0 and let
p(z;t;E) = q(z;to
￿i;tu)+r(to
i) where r(:) is a known di⁄erentiable function. Then
for any (z;to;tu), the function wz(z) is identi￿ed.

































i 6= 0 if
@2j(z(to;tu);t)
@z@to
i 6= 0. Hence, varying to
i while holding to
￿i and tu
constant will vary z and hence wz(z). However, since
@p(z;t;E)
@to

































where const is a constant of integration.
35Holding to
￿i ￿xed at t
o
￿i and tu ￿xed at t
u, variations in to
i generate variations















An important special case is met when r(to
i) is a constant. This occurs when
to
i is a pure preference attribute, i.e.
@2j(z(to;tu);t)
@z@to




i) = 0 for
all z and to
i. This means that to
i plays the role of an exclusion restriction in the
wage equation. Attribute to
i is an argument of the mapping function z(:) but not
of wt(:). This holds for all values of to
￿i and tu. Holding to
￿i = t
o
￿i and tu = t
u, we




u)), up to a constant, as w(to
i), where w(to
i) is






Since the estimation results presented in Heckman et al. (2005) follow once we have
estimated wz(z), this paper focuses on the estimation of wz(z) and refers the reader
to Heckman at al. (2005) for the estimation of j(z;t;A). To present the problem in
terms of random functions, let W, T o, Z be the observable variables of our model
and let T u be the unobservable variable. All variables are of dimension 1 except T o
that has dimension of at least 1. Let our model be W = wz(Z)+wt(T o;T u) where
wz and wt are unknown functions continuous in Z and (T o;T u) respectively. The
functions wz and wt are assumed to belong to the set of functions derived from
36the uni￿ed economy outlined above. Let FTu(:) be the distribution of T u and
let FW;Z;To(:;w0;F 0
Tu) be the joint distribution of the observable variables when
w = w0 and F 0
Tu = FTu. Assume that T u is independent of T o. Our data consist
of a sample of N draws of W, Z and T o from a single hedonic market.
To estimate wz, we need ￿rst to estimate the mapping function. From the
proof of Lemma 1 we know that z(to;tu) is strictly increasing in its last argument




















The ￿rst equality follows by the de￿nition of FTu, the second by the indepen-
dence of T o and T u, the third by the monotonicity of z(to;:) and the fourth by the
de￿nition of FZjTo=to.
Suppose we know FTu, since F
￿1








Suppose instead that we normalize the mapping function so that for some t
o
and all tu we have z(t
o;tu) = tu. From Equation 14, we have FTu(tu) = FZjTo=t
o(tu)
and we therefore identify the distribution of T u from the distribution of Z condi-
tional on T o = t
o. The expression of the function z is now given by noting that
FZjTo=to(z(to;tu)) = FTu(tu) = FZjTo=t
o(z(t
o;tu)). The ￿rst equality follows from
the monotonicity of z(to;:) in its last argument and the second holds from the











Estimates of z are obtained by replacing the true distributions F by their kernel
estimators b F following the de￿nitions provided in section 3.4 in Matzkin (2003) or
pp. 32-33 in Heckman et al. (2005), in the above equalities. Denote b z(to;tu) the
estimated mapping function. Theorem 1 suggests the following estimator b wz(z) of






















using the known function r to calculate r(to
i).
6 Extensions
6.1 The uni￿ed hedonic production economy model
Suppose that instead of being endowed with a machine, ￿rms can produce their
own machine. For instance, ￿rms could invest in less noisy machines, safer ma-
chines, machines requiring less physical strength to operate, high-tech machines
etc. Suppose further that ￿rms are endowed with a vector of attributes y, y 2 Rny.
To ￿x ideas, these attributes could be related to investments capacities but also to
the managers￿attributes, again, either skills or preferences. Let fy(y) and Fy(y)
be the PDF and CDF of y respectively and let Fy be absolutely continuous with
respect to Lebesgue measure.
Let the costs of producing a machine with attributes z for a ￿rm with attributes
y be given by the continuous function c(y;z;G) with parameters G. It is still
assumed that to produce output each machine needs to be operated by one and
39only one worker so that workers and ￿rms match one-to-one. The pro￿ts of a ￿rm
with attributes y producing output with machine z and employing worker t are
now given by:
r(z;t;y) = p(z;t;E) ￿ w(z;t) ￿ c(y;z;G)
The ￿rst order condition to utility maximization is unchanged and given by
equation 1. We therefore have the mapping function z(t;A;wz) indicating the
optimal machine demanded by a worker with attributes t when wage di⁄erential
at z is given by wz. However, ￿rms are now maximizing pro￿ts by selecting the

















Let t(z;E;wt) denote the implicit function that solves Equation 16 for t given
parameters E and function wt where wt ￿ @w
@t . This function indicates the optimal
40worker t to select for a ￿rm supplying machine with attributes z when the wage
di⁄erential at t is given by wt. Let z(y;t;G;wz) denote the implicit function that
solves Equation 15 for z given parameters E and G and function wz ￿ @w
@z . This
function indicates the optimal machine z to supply for a ￿rm with attributes y
employing worker with attributes t. Substituting t(z;E;wt) for t in z(y;t;G;wz)
we obtain an implicit function z(y;E;G;wt;wz) indicating the optimal machine
z￿ = z(y;E;G;wt;wz) to supply for a ￿rm with attributes y given productivity
parameters E, costs parameters G and wage function w.
Assume further that the total surplus function s(z;t;E;A;G) ￿ p(z;t;E) ￿
c(y;z;G) ￿ j(z;t;A) satis￿es the generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition so that
equilibrium is pure and the mapping functions z(y;E;G;wt;wz) and t(z;A;wz)
are invertible. De￿ne these inverse functions as y(z;E;G;wt;wz) and z(t;A;wz)














￿ ￿ ￿dz. For an equilibrium to be reached, the sup-
ply of machines with attributes z should be equal to workers￿demand for machines














41Equilibrium will be reached by choosing the right shape for the function w and
in particular the right di⁄erentials at t and z. The equilibrium in this economy
is therefore characterized by a wage function w(z;t) and a mapping of workers￿
attributes onto jobs￿attributes t(z;A;wz) and a mapping function of ￿rms at-
tributes onto jobs￿attributes and workers￿attributes y(z;E;G;wt;wz) so that i)
supply equals demand everywhere on the support of z ￿provided all workers and
￿rms receive more than their reservation levels￿ , ii) workers maximize utility and
iii) ￿rms maximize pro￿ts (rents minus costs of producing z).
6.2 Generalization to other markets
This paper relates to the general literature on hedonic models and not only on
that segment focussing on the labor market. For instance, Epple￿ s (1984) ex-
tension of Tinbergen￿ s endowed economy to a production economy was originally
written in a consumer/producer context, not a worker/￿rm context. The classical
consumer/producer setting reads as follow.
There is a market for a good of attributes z and let p(z) be the hedonic equi-
librium price. Producers are endowed attributes y, y 2 Rny. To ￿x ideas, these
attributes could be related to investments capacities but also to the managers￿
attributes, again, either skills or preferences. Let fy(y) and Fy(y) be the PDF
and CDF of y respectively and let Fy be absolutely continuous with respect to
42Lebesgue measure. Firms pro￿ts are given by p(z) ￿ c(z;y;G). Consumers are
endowed with attributes t, t 2 Rnt, that re￿ ect their preferences for the product.
Let ft(t) and Ft(t) be the PDF and CDF of t respectively and let Ft be absolutely
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. Utility is given by k(z;t;K)￿p(z)
where k(z;t;K) is the indirect utility derived from consumption of z and K are
preference parameters common to all consumers. In this classical setting, out-
put is either produced without labor input or, labor input belongs to y and is
￿xed at the time ￿rms decide what z to produce. Firms choose to produce the z
that maximizes their pro￿ts and consumers/workers choose to consume the z that
maximizes their utility.
An extension of the classical hedonic model related to the uni￿ed model outline
above would be to allow ￿rms to choose the type of worker to hire simultaneously
with their choice of z. Suppose that to produce a unit of good of quality z, ￿rms
need to hire one and only one worker, ￿say y is a machine that needs to be
operated by ￿xed quantity of workers, one and only one worker￿. Suppose that
the costs of producing z for a ￿rm y when employing worker with attributes t are
c(z;y;t;G). Pro￿ts for ￿rm y employing t to produce z are p(z) ￿ c(z;y;t;G) ￿
w(z;t) where w(z;t) is the wage of worker t at job z. Suppose workers t derive
indirect disutility j(z0;t;A) while working at producing z0. Workers utility is then
given by k(z;t;K) ￿ j(z0;t;A) + w(z0;t) ￿ p(z).
43In this economy, ￿rms/producers optimize on z and t0 and workers/consumers














Let z(y;t0;G;wz;p0) be the implicit function that solves Equation 17 for z
the optimal good to produce for ￿rm y with worker t0 and let t0(z;y;G;wt) be
the implicit function solving Equation 18 for t0 the optimal worker to hire for
￿rm y to produce z. Substituting t0(z;y;G;wt) for t0 in z(y;t0;G;wz;p0) yields
z(y;G;wt;wz;p0) the optimal quality of good to produce for a ￿rm with attributes y
given production technology G, the equilibrium wage function w(z;t) ￿the slopes￿
and the equilibrium price function p(z).











44Let t(z;K;p0) be the implicit function that solves Equation 19. This function
indicates the attributes of workers consuming good of quality z in equilibrium,
given product tastes K, and the equilibrium price function. Let z0(t;A;wz) be the
implicit function that solves Equation 20. This function indicates the optimal job
to choose for workers with attributes t given job tastes A and the equilibrium wage
function w(z;t).
In equilibrium, the worker that consumes good of quality z might not neces-
sarily be the one that produces z, i.e. t(z;K;p0) 6= t0(z;y;G;wt) in general.
7 Conclusion
This paper uni￿es the two classes of models within the sorting literature. The
model nests both Tinbergen￿ s model of sorting on job preferences and Sattinger￿ s
model of sorting on productivity. Under the assumption that all jobs￿attributes
lead to intrinsic disutility but workers￿attributes do not a⁄ect productivity the
model collapses to Tinbergen￿ s model. Workers care about their job satisfaction
but are equally productive at all jobs. This means that the equilibrium wage
function does not depend on workers￿attributes but merely on jobs￿attributes.
Opposite to this, under the assumption that all workers￿attributes contribute to
productivity but no jobs￿attributes lead to intrinsic disutility the model collapses
to Sattinger￿ s di⁄erential rents model. Workers do not care about job satisfaction,
45only about their wage, but workers with di⁄erent attributes are unequally produc-
tivity. This means that the equilibrium wage function does not depend on jobs￿
attributes but merely on workers￿attributes. In the more general case depicted
in the unifying model, workers do care about job satisfaction and productivity
depends on workers￿attributes. As a result, the equilibrium wage function has
both workers￿and jobs￿attributes as arguments. it is shown that this wage func-
tion is additive separable and an example of closed form solution is provided when
productivity and job satisfaction are quadratic and attributes on both sides are
normally distributed.
The model is ￿ exible enough to allow the correlation between the contribution
of workers￿attributes to wages and that of jobs￿attributes to vary between -1
to 1. This correlation depends on preference parameters, technology parameters
and the distribution of workers and jobs￿attributes. The model therefore provides
an explanation for Abowd et al.￿ s (1999) puzzling ￿nding of a low or even nega-
tive correlation between workers￿and ￿rms￿￿xed-e⁄ects in wage regressions using
matched employer-employee data that does not require (large) frictions (Shimer
(2005)).
The model has implications for the estimation of preference (technology respec-
tively) parameters in hedonic models. Recently, Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004)
and Heckman et al. (2005) have shown conditions under which nonparametric
46identi￿cation of additive and nonadditive marginal utility models of the Tinber-
gen class is possible in a single hedonic market. These conditions depend crucially
on the assumption that wz(z) is known (or estimated from data on wages and z).
While this is true by de￿nition in the Tinbergen class of models studied by Ekeland
et al. and Heckman et al., in the uni￿ed economy, wages are given by the function
w(z;t) = wz(z)+wt(t) where the functions wz(z) and wt(t) are unknown. Without
further assumption, wz(z) is not identi￿ed nonparametrically since for any value
of t, the value of z is uniquely determined by the mapping function z = z(t). This
paper ￿rst shows in Lemma 1 that the mapping function z(t) is identi￿ed non-
parametrically using results from Matzkin (2003). Lemma 1 generalizes Heckman
et al.￿ s (2005) results to the uni￿ed hedonic model. Using the identi￿cation result
for z(t), this paper shows conditions under which wz(z) is identi￿ed nonparamet-
rically. These conditions impose shape restrictions on the production function
p(z;t). In particular, the method assumes that p(z;t) = q(z;t￿i) + r(ti) where
r(:) is a known di⁄erentiable function and with t =< t￿i;ti > and where ti is
a preference attribute, i.e. so that
@j(z;t;A)
@z@ti 6= 0. A special case is met when ti
is a pure preference attribute, that is, ti a⁄ects utility but not productivity, i.e.
@j(z;t;A)
@z@ti 6= 0 and
@p(z;t;E)
@ti = 0 for all z and ti. Attribute ti is an exclusion restriction
in wt(:) since it does not a⁄ect productivity but not in wz(:) since it matters for
job satisfaction.
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51Appendix:
























The second step holds from the additive separability of w(z;t). Using the
second order condition, we have
@z(to;tu)
@tu > 0 if
@2j(z(to;tu);t)
@z@tu < 0. The mapping
function is strictly increasing in tu. Therefore, z(to;tu) is identi￿ed using normal-
ization results from Matzkin (2003) and assuming that to and tu are independently
distributed. Normalization is required since there exist monotonic transformations
g so that (g ￿ z;Ftu ￿ g￿1) and (z;Ftu), where Ftu is the CDF of tu, generate the
same data. However, one can show that z(to;tu) is identi￿ed nonparametrically
using a normalization (choosing one function g). One could either normalize the
distribution of tu (uniform for instance) or normalize the shape of the function
z(to;tu) by imposing z(t
o;tu) = tu for some t
o for instance.
Suppose that we assume a certain distribution on tu, so that Ftu is known, then
Fzjto=x(z) = Ftu(y) tells us that z(x;y) is the same quantile of the distribution of




Suppose instead that we normalize the mapping function so that for some t
o and
all tu we have z(t
o;tu) = tu. We can then show that Ftu(tu) = Fzjto=t
o(z(t
o;tu)).
We therefore identify the distribution of tu from the distribution of z condi-
tional on to = t
o. The expression of the function z is now given by noting that
Fzjto(z(to;tu)) = Ftu(tu) = Fzjto=t
o(z(t
o;tu)). The ￿rst equality holds since z(to;tu)
is strictly increasing over tu and the second holds from the previous normalization.
This means that z(to;tu) = F
￿1
zjto
￿
Fzjto=t
o(tu)
￿
.
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